HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C

🔴 High Risk

HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C, a Dubai-registered entity operating as hanedan general trading l.l.c dubai, emerged in investigations tied to money laundering through networks processing over $250 million in suspicious funds via U.S. banks. This hanedan general trading l.l.c uae firm facilitated linked transactions linked to Iranian sanctions evasion and laundromats like the Azerbaijani and Russian schemes, highlighting gaps in customer due diligence (CDD) and know your customer (KYC) protocols.

The case underscores HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C’s role in trade-based laundering, where opaque trades masked illicit flows, making it a benchmark for anti–money laundering (AML) compliance in high-risk trading sectors. Its exposure via leaked suspicious activity reports (SARs) reveals persistent challenges in financial transparency for UAE general trading firms.

Background and Context

HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C functioned primarily as a conduit for international payments, with its hanedan general trading l.l.c address in Dubai enabling access to global banking networks without evident operational depth. Prior to scrutiny, the hanedan general trading l.l.c company showed no public records of substantial hanedan general trading l.l.c revenue, hanedan general trading l.l.c net worth, or hanedan general trading l.l.c financial statements, suggesting a lightweight structure typical of conduits.

Timeline markers include 2013 transfers: $4.188 million from LCM Alliance via Danske Bank Estonia, followed by $1.58 million from PR-Vert System Ltd through Trasta Komercbanka, both tied to laundromats. These hanedan general trading l.l.c suspicious transaction patterns escalated exposure when U.S. prosecutors detailed $250 million routed through banks like Bank of America and HSBC.

No confirmed hanedan general trading l.l.c year of establishment or hanedan general trading l.l.c director details surfaced, but its integration into Zarrab-associated networks points to strategic formation for electronic funds transfer (EFT) facilitation.

Mechanisms and Laundering Channels

HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C employed structuring via multiple wire transfers lacking descriptive purposes, such as five 2013 installments from LCM Alliance citing only invoice numbers. These fed into hanedan general trading l.l.c trade-based laundering, mirroring falsified invoices in Zarrab schemes converting funds through UAE-Turkey channels.

As a potential hanedan general trading l.l.c shell company, it received funds from laundromat entities like those in the Azerbaijani network, then disbursed to Iranian-linked oil traders, evading sanctions via hanedan general trading l.l.c offshore entity traits despite UAE basing. Transactions with Atlantis Capital General Trading, which moved $1 billion to Iranian banks, formed hanedan general trading l.l.c linked transactions.

HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C hybrid money laundering blended trade invoicing with bank hops across Estonia, Latvia, and UAE, exploiting cash-intensive business facades without verifiable goods movement.

Regulatory and Legal Response

U.S. prosecutors flagged HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C in sanctions evasion cases, but no direct UAE enforcement like forced liquidation occurred, unlike peers facing Central Bank scrutiny. Standard Chartered SARs prompted UAE notifications, yet activity persisted via other banks, echoing FinCEN Files gaps.

Name screening failures linked it to FATF non-compliant networks; UAE’s goAML registration mandates under Cabinet Decision No. (10) of 2019 applied, but lapses in beneficial ownership disclosure persisted. OCCRP investigations prompted no public penalties for HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C, unlike Halkbank’s U.S. charges.

No HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C politically exposed person (PEP) ties confirmed, but Iranian connections invoked IEEPA violations carrying 20-year terms.

Financial Transparency and Global Accountability

HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C exposed UAE financial transparency voids, with anonymous ownership shielding hanedan general trading l.l.c beneficial owner identities amid $250 million U.S. flows. International banks’ SARs to FinCEN highlighted cross-border gaps, pressuring UAE for enhanced anti–money laundering (AML) data sharing.

Watchdogs like OCCRP drove accountability, but absent hanedan general trading l.l.c financial statements or audits, reforms lagged. The case aligned with FATF pushes for UAE beneficial registry access, indirectly bolstering global CDD standards.

Lessons reinforced KYC rigor for Dubai traders, spurring inter-agency cooperation post-FinCEN leaks.

Economic and Reputational Impact

No public hanedan general trading l.l.c stock exists as an LLC, but flagged status likely severed partnerships, impacting hanedan general trading l.l.c business viability and hanedan general trading l.l.c careers prospects. hanedan general trading l.l.c revenue opacity masked losses from de-risking by banks like Deutsche Bank.

Broader effects hit UAE trader confidence, mirroring sanctions on Dubai oil firms, eroding investor trust in hanedan general trading l.l.c dubai office hubs. No hanedan general trading l.l.c branch expansions noted post-exposure.

Stakeholder fallout included halted EFTs, stabilizing markets via U.S. actions but signaling risks for UAE logistics.

Governance and Compliance Lessons

HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C corporate governance lacked evident internal controls, enabling structuring without transaction flags. Absent CDD verification fueled HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C fraud risks via unverified invoices.

Post-exposure, UAE regulators intensified name screening for general traders, though no HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C reforms announced. Lessons emphasize automated KYC for high-volume EFTs and ownership audits.

Gaps in board oversight highlight needs for independent AML officers in similar entities.

Legacy and Industry Implications

HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C shaped AML enforcement by exemplifying laundromat-UAE nexuses, influencing OCCRP-FATF scrutiny on Dubai conduits. It catalyzed stricter UAE FIU STR protocols for trade-based laundering.

Industry-wide, it elevated corporate governance benchmarks, with banks adopting advanced CDD for UAE traders, reducing shell usage. No turning point for hanedan general trading l.l.c jobs sectors, but ethics training rose.

HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C’s money laundering ties via $250+ million suspicious flows reveal critical beneficial ownership and KYC failures. Core lessons stress robust financial transparency and global AML frameworks to counter such conduits.

Country of Incorporation

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

Headquarters: Dubai, UAE
Main area of operations: Primarily UAE, with cross-border financial transactions involving the US banking system and links to international transfers with Russia, Iran, and possibly other jurisdictions.

General Trading
Construction equipment
Building materials
Possibly involved in broader import/export activities as a front for illicit finance.

Functioned as a shell company/front company
Owned by Mohammad Zarrab, Reza Zarrab, Camelia Jamshidy, and Hossein Jagafzadeh.

Trade-based laundering: Used invoices for goods unrelated to the company’s stated activity to disguise the illicit origin of funds.
Shell layering: Operated as a seemingly legitimate business to layer and mask cross-border wire transfers and illicit proceeds.
Invoice fraud: Transactions were claimed to be for the sale of construction and industrial equipment, but the purpose and provenance were often unverifiable.
Utilization of correspondent banking: Large volumes of money moved through major global banks (JP Morgan, Citi, HSBC, Standard Chartered, Wells Fargo), enabling the international movement and obfuscation of funds in violation of sanctions.

Mohammad Zarrab: Owner/operator, brother of Reza Zarrab and closely involved in operations linked to laundering.
Reza Zarrab: Turkish-Iranian businessman previously indicted and convicted in US for sanctions evasion schemes.

The Zarrab network paid bribes to Turkish political figures (including then-Interior Minister Muammer Guler), and there were payments connected to Mahan Air, a sanctioned Iranian entity involved with Iran’s government.

Azerbaijani Laundromat: Key recipient of suspicious funds from LCM Alliance (British firm core to the Azerbaijani Laundromat scheme).
US Federal Indictments: Named in US court actions for laundering and Iran sanctions evasion.
OCCRP (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project) investigations.
Rozana FM, ARIJ-supported investigation on Russian money laundering (2013-2014): Connected to a $1.6 million deal with PR-VERT SYSTEM LIMITED.

High.
The UAE has been identified as a haven for such shell and laundering networks, and Hanedan has been directly named on US sanctions lists.
Multiple transactions involved banks in other high-risk jurisdictions.

Sanctioned by the US: Named on the US Treasury OFAC sanctions list for connections to Iran sanctions evasion.
Subject of federal indictments: Charges in US for laundering, sanctions violations, and false invoicing; Zarrab himself was indicted.
Dubai authorities non-responsive: No meaningful engagement from UAE regulatory authorities or banks involved during investigative reporting.

Under Investigation / Sanctioned.
The group has been under multi-jurisdictional scrutiny since 2013 for multiple money laundering and sanctions violations; some associated entities may be defunct, but Hanedan is referenced in ongoing US sanctions enforcement.

2010–2015: Hanedan processed more than $250 million via US and EU financial institutions, often disguising the true nature and source of the funds.
2013: Received $4.2 million from LCM Alliance (Azerbaijani Laundromat network); involved in $1.6 million construction equipment deal with PR-VERT SYSTEM LIMITED in April 2013, wired via Bank of Baroda in Dubai.
2013-2014: Major focus of Russian Laundromat money flow investigations via Rozana FM and OCCRP; listed among 13 UAE entities facilitating suspicious flows from Russia and other high-risk countries.
2016–present: Included in OCCRP and US government documentation of global financial crimes; US sanctions and legal proceedings ongoing.
2021: Further banking and legal scrutiny as new details of the Zarrab network’s tactics emerge in the US and EU.
2023–2025: Hanedan remains listed in regulatory and investigative reports as a key node in Iranian/Russian laundering networks.

Trade-Based Laundering, Layering, Invoice Fraud, Shell Company

MENA – Gulf States/EU/Russia/Iran

High Risk Country (UAE, Russia, Iran, cross-border US/EU exposure)

HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C

HANEDAN GENERAL TRADING L.L.C
Country of Registration:
United Arab Emirates
Headquarters:
Al Rigga, Deira, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Jurisdiction Risk:
High
Industry/Sector:
General Trading, Construction, Import/Export
Laundering Method Used:

Shell layering, Trade-based laundering, Invoice fraud, Sanctions evasion

Linked Individuals:

Mohammad Zarrab, Reza Zarrab, Camelia Jamshidy, Hossein Jagafzadeh

Known Shell Companies:

Connected to Azerbaijani Laundromat and other shell company networks

Offshore Links:
1
Estimated Amount Laundered:
Over $250 million
🔴 High Risk