001k

In the shadowy intersection of cryptocurrency innovation and financial crime, 001k.exchange emerges as a stark exemplar of how crypto-to-cash courier services exploit regulatory blind spots to enable massive-scale money laundering, processing over 14.8 billion USD in primarily USDT since 2022 with virtually no KYC enforcement—relying instead on absurdly rudimentary banknote serial numbers for cash handoffs in cities like New York, Miami, and Toronto. This Ukraine-based operation, thrust into the spotlight by ICIJ’s 2025 Coin Laundry investigation and corroborated by NGO exposés linking it to WhiteBIT and oligarchic networks, exemplifies a pernicious typology where anonymous stablecoin inflows layer through major exchanges like Binance, OKX, and Kraken before materializing as untraceable physical cash, brazenly circumventing AML mandates across North America, Europe, and beyond. Far from a fringe actor, 001k’s systemic volumes and cross-jurisdictional footprint—amid ongoing probes in Canada, Austria, Ukraine, and the UAE—underscore the urgent imperative for harmonized global enforcement to dismantle these high-risk conduits that threaten to normalize illicit finance in the digital age.

001k / 001k.exchange is a Ukraine‑based crypto‑to‑cash service that has processed more than 14.8 billion USD in digital assets since 2022, offering in‑person cash payouts in cities across North America with little or no KYC and relying on simple token-based authentication (banknote serial numbers) instead of identity verification. Investigative work and NGO reporting link 001k’s wallets to substantial flows through major centralized exchanges and to broader laundering schemes involving WhiteBIT, leading to accusations that the platform is a major global conduit for laundering criminal proceeds and evading AML regimes, and prompting ongoing law‑enforcement and regulatory scrutiny in multiple jurisdictions.

Countries Involved

Primarily Ukraine (base of 001k), with activity and cash drops reported in Canada (e.g., Toronto), United States (New York, Miami, Los Angeles), and links to EU and other jurisdictions via connected exchanges such as WhiteBIT.

Date Discovered / Reported

Public investigative exposure in 2025, including ICIJ’s Coin Laundry series (November 2025) and related analytical and NGO reporting earlier in 2025.

Cryptocurrency Involved

USDT (Tether) primarily; other major cryptocurrencies routed via centralized exchanges

Type of Crime

Suspected large‑scale money laundering and unlicensed money service / money transfer activity using crypto‑to‑cash services, with associated risks of facilitating proceeds from fraud, extortion and other predicate offenses.

Entities Involved

001k / 001k.exchange as the core crypto‑to‑cash operator; customer wallets and accounts at major exchanges including Binance, OKX, Kraken and WhiteBIT receiving significant flows from 001k‑linked wallets.

PEP Involvement

Alleged / Indirect. Open‑source reporting around related schemes involving WhiteBIT and 001k mentions potential links to politically exposed persons and Ukrainian officials alleged to be protecting or enabling the platform, but this remains under investigation and not judicially established.

Laundering Techniques Used

Crypto‑to‑cash courier payouts in major cities with no meaningful KYC, using a banknote serial number as the only authentication factor at handover.
Layering via transfers from anonymous or lightly‑screened wallets into 001k, then onward to large centralized exchanges (Binance, OKX, Kraken, WhiteBIT) to integrate funds into the broader crypto ecosystem.
Use of multiple exchanges and accounts (“clouding” funds) before returning assets to real wallets or bank accounts without clear traceability to the original illicit source.

Estimated Value Laundered

Blockchain analytics cited for 001k indicate more than 14.8 billion USD in cryptocurrency received since August 2022, with over 400 million USD flowing to Binance customer accounts, around 54 million USD to OKX, 13 million USD to Kraken, and more than 1.1 billion USD to WhiteBIT accounts.
(Separately, one NGO report estimates about 2.7 billion USD laundered through WhiteBIT overall, with 001k one of the conduits, but this figure refers to the broader WhiteBIT‑linked scheme rather than 001k alone.)

Transaction Analysis Summary

ICIJ and partners linked a network of wallets controlled or serviced by 001k to high‑volume flows in and out of major exchanges, with transaction patterns consistent with cash‑out services (incoming stablecoins, rapid onward movement, and no conventional customer profiling). An undercover test in Canada showed 2,000 USDT sent to a 001k address and converted to cash with no ID requested, indicating deliberate circumvention of standard KYC/AML procedures despite thresholds that would normally trigger reporting obligations.

Regulatory/Enforcement Actions Taken

Canada: Media and expert commentary state the test transaction likely violated Canadian anti‑money‑laundering regulations governing money‑services businesses, though specific enforcement actions against 001k itself have not yet been publicly detailed.
Europe / Ukraine: Civil society reporting notes ongoing investigations involving WhiteBIT and affiliated services (including 001k) in Austria, the UAE, Uzbekistan, Lithuania and the EU for money‑laundering and related offenses, as well as criminal proceedings initiated by Ukrainian authorities citing money laundering and collaboration‑related articles of the Criminal Code.

Links to Reports / Sources

Case Title / Operation Name:

001k / 001k.exchange Crypto-to-Cash Laundering Risk Case

Country(s) Involved:

Canada, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States, Uzbekistan

Platform / Exchange Used:

001k / 001k.exchange; Binance; OKX; Kraken; WhiteBIT

Cryptocurrency Involved:

USDT (Tether) primarily; other major cryptocurrencies routed via centralized exchanges

Volume Laundered (USD est.):

Approx. 14.8+ billion USD in crypto received by 001k-linked wallets since August 2022; within this, 400M+ USD to Binance, ~54M USD to OKX, ~13M USD to Kraken, 1.1B+ USD to WhiteBIT; NGO estimate 2.7B USD via WhiteBIT overall

Wallet Addresses / TxIDs :

Network of 001k-controlled or serviced wallets identified in investigative and analytics reporting (specific addresses redacted for this template but available in cited investigations and technical appendices).

Method of Laundering:

Crypto-to-cash courier payouts in major cities with no conventional KYC; authentication via banknote serial number instead of ID; receipt of stablecoins into 001k wallets followed by rapid onward transfers to centralized exchanges for layering and integration; use of multiple exchanges and accounts to obscure origin before conversion or withdrawal.

Source of Funds:

Suspected proceeds of fraud, corruption, offshore oligarch funds, tax evasion and other predicate offenses, routed into 001k as a cash-out channel; civil-society and media reports point to oligarch and politically linked capital seeking evasion of sanctions and AML scrutiny.

Associated Shell Companies:

Reporting highlights connections between 001k/WhiteBIT ecosystems and offshore/opaque corporate structures allegedly used by Ukrainian and regional business elites, though specific shell entities are not fully disclosed in open sources and remain subject to ongoing investigations.

PEPs or Individuals Involved:

Alleged involvement or protection by certain Ukrainian politically exposed persons and influential business figures tied to WhiteBIT and related structures; names and roles appear in NGO and media investigations but have not all been confirmed or adjudicated in court.

Law Enforcement / Regulatory Action:

Media and expert analysis indicate probable breaches of Canadian and other AML/Money Service Business rules; civil-society sources report investigations involving WhiteBIT/001k in Austria, the UAE, Uzbekistan, Lithuania and EU states, plus criminal proceedings in Ukraine for money laundering and collaboration-related offenses; no large, publicized global takedown of 001k has yet been reported.

Year of Occurrence:

2022–2025 (activity observed from at least August 2022; major public exposure and cross-border investigative reporting in 2025).

Ongoing Case:

Ongoing

AML Network Risk Rating:

🔴 High Risk