DragonForce Ransomware

🔴 High Risk

The DragonForce ransomware case highlights the growing threat of cybercrime and cryptocurrency-based money laundering in Saudi Arabia’s evolving digital economy. Despite regulatory progress, the gang exploited gaps in enforcement and technology to extort millions in Bitcoin, using advanced obfuscation techniques and ransomware-as-a-service networks. This case underscores the urgent need for stronger crypto-tracing tools, cross-border collaboration, and enhanced cybercrime response capabilities.

The DragonForce ransomware gang exemplifies the growing threat of cybercrime-facilitated money laundering in Saudi Arabia’s digital economy. Targeting high-value sectors like real estate and construction, the gang executes ransomware attacks, encrypting critical data and demanding Bitcoins as payment under tight deadlines tied to cultural events such as Ramadan. Using advanced ransomware-as-a-service tools, encrypted communication methods, and an extensive underground affiliate network, DragonForce obfuscates ransom transactions across multiple cryptocurrency wallets and platforms, complicating traceability. Despite Saudi Arabia’s regulatory advances imposing strict AML requirements on crypto exchanges and digital payments, the enforcement capability to detect and disrupt these laundering schemes remains limited. The gang’s activities highlight vulnerabilities in Saudi Arabia’s financial ecosystem exploited via cryptocurrency laundering to convert and integrate criminal proceeds safely, posing significant risks to national economic security and the integrity of emerging digital finance channels.

Countries Involved

Saudi Arabia

February 2025 (notably reported incidents in early 2025)

BTC

Ransomware attacks, cyber extortion, data theft, and money laundering through cryptocurrency

DragonForce ransomware gang (an independent ransomware affiliate group active on the Dark Web); victims include large Saudi enterprises, notably in real estate and construction sectors.

No confirmed involvement of Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) has been reported.

The DragonForce gang conducts ransomware attacks to extort companies, demanding ransom payments primarily in Bitcoin to conceal traceability. Following ransom acquisition, funds are rapidly funneled through multiple cryptocurrency wallets and decentralized systems to obfuscate their origin. The gang uses sophisticated encryption, private chat mechanisms, and affiliate networks on TOR and underground forums to evade law enforcement. Additionally, the use of legitimate file transfer tools (SFTP, MEGA) for data exfiltration further complicates detection. Affiliate payments are managed via ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) models with commission systems, facilitating layering and integration of illicit proceeds into the broader financial system. These activities exploit Saudi Arabia’s emerging digital economy and relatively nascent regulatory frameworks on cryptocurrency monitoring, enabling the laundering of extorted funds with reduced risk of interception.

Precise figures for DragonForce ransomware extortion in Saudi Arabia are not publicly disclosed; however, global ransomware gangs have been known to extort multi-million-dollar ransoms. Given the targeting of major KSA conglomerates and a ransom-time pressure tactic aligned with Ramadan, estimated values in the high millions of USD range are likely. Globally, ransomware gangs received approximately $24.4 billion in illicit cryptocurrency payments in 2023, indicating the scale of such criminal operations.

The tracing of cryptocurrency related to ransomware ransom payments reveals rapid movement of Bitcoin through multiple wallet addresses, using conversion between cryptocurrencies and transfers to various intermediate wallets to conceal trail. The gang employs encrypted communication channels, private chat features, and vetted affiliate networks to manage operations and payments. Automated data leak sites for extorted data incentivize quick payment, increasing transaction volume and complexity. The use of decentralized privacy-preserving wallets and sophisticated payload builders administered through centralized RaaS dashboards further complicates forensic efforts. Despite Saudi Arabia’s tightening AML (Anti-Money Laundering) regulations targeting digital payments and cryptocurrency exchanges, the agility of these cybercriminal techniques continues to challenge enforcement.

The Saudi Central Bank has introduced stricter AML compliance rules, especially for digital wallets and cryptocurrency exchanges monitoring, to mitigate laundering risks. However, judiciary and enforcement agencies in Saudi Arabia reportedly lack sufficient updated forensic and tracing tools to effectively counter cyber-enabled financial crimes. International cooperation and adoption of enhanced Know-Your-Customer (KYC) protocols on crypto platforms globally contribute to efforts in curtailing illicit flows. Saudi authorities are increasing vigilance on cybercrime-money laundering nexus, but ransomware gangs operate with a degree of impunity by exploiting gaps in technology and legal frameworks. The substantial financial and national security risks posed by such ransomware extortion have pressured authorities to enhance cybersecurity infrastructure and legal responses.

Detailed analysis of DragonForce ransomware targeting Saudi Arabia: Resecurity, March 2025
Money laundering and cybercrime nexus in Saudi Arabia: Tookitaki Compliance Hub, July 2025
Saudi AML regulatory updates on digital economy: Tookitaki, July 2025
Cryptocurrency laundering challenges and ransomware: TechInformed

DragonForce Ransomware Gang Cryptocurrency Tracing and Money Laundering in Saudi Arabia
Case Title / Operation Name:
DragonForce Ransomware Gang Cryptocurrency Tracing and Money Laundering in Saudi Arabia
Country(s) Involved:
Saudi Arabia
Platform / Exchange Used:
Unspecified; likely involved decentralized exchanges, TOR-based private trading, and anonymous peer-to-peer platforms
Cryptocurrency Involved:

BTC

Volume Laundered (USD est.):
Estimated in high millions USD (exact amount undisclosed)
Wallet Addresses / TxIDs :
Not publicly disclosed
Method of Laundering:

Layering through multiple wallets, privacy coins conversion, RaaS commissions, decentralized systems, TOR communication, legitimate file-sharing tools for data exfiltration

Source of Funds:

Ransomware, cyber extortion, data theft

Associated Shell Companies:

No publicly linked shell companies reported

PEPs or Individuals Involved:

No confirmed Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) or individuals disclosed

Law Enforcement / Regulatory Action:
Saudi Central Bank tightened AML rules for digital wallets and crypto exchanges; enforcement capabilities remain limited, with ongoing efforts to enhance forensic tools and cross-border cooperation
Year of Occurrence:
20250201
Ongoing Case:
Ongoing
🔴 High Risk