Monkey Drainer

🔴 High Risk

Monkey Drainer exposes a worrying convergence of technical sophistication and weak local‑level oversight in Nigeria’s crypto ecosystem. Nigerian‑linked operators exploited the tool’s simplicity to run mass‑scale phishing campaigns, while Nigerian‑facing exchanges and P2P networks effectively enabled laundering by cashing out stolen crypto into naira with minimal scrutiny. This not only amplifies individual financial losses but also normalizes large‑scale illicit‑asset flows within the formal and informal economy, undermining trust in digital finance and exposing Nigerian regulators’ inability to track cross‑border crypto‑enabled crime.

The “Monkey Drainer” case centers on a phishing‑based scam‑as‑a‑service platform that enabled global operators—particularly Nigerian‑linked cybercriminal groups—to automatically drain crypto wallets by tricking users into approving malicious contracts. The Nigerian‑linked nodes used Telegram‑distributed drainer kits, tailored lures in Nigerian English and Pidgin, and social‑media‑driven campaigns to target local retail investors and diaspora users. After draining Ethereum‑based assets such as ETH, USDT, and high‑value NFTs, these actors routed stolen funds through on‑chain mixers like Tornado Cash and cross‑chain bridges, then layered them into Nigerian‑facing exchanges and P2P platforms where they were converted into naira. This created a Nigeria‑anchored laundering pipeline that turned crypto theft proceeds into local‑currency wealth and luxury‑goods purchases. Nigerian‑market reports link Monkey Drainer‑style drainers to tens of millions of dollars of the roughly $452 million in crypto losses endured by Nigerian investors over a three‑month period in 2023. The scheme therefore combines mass‑scale cyber‑fraud, unauthorized contract approvals, and large‑volume money‑laundering through Nigerian‑based financial‑conversion channels, marking it as a systemic threat to Nigeria’s crypto‑financial integrity rather than an isolated hacking incident.

Countries Involved

Nigeria (primary execution and laundering hub), United States (investigation and main jurisdiction), and multiple global jurisdictions (victim countries, exchange‑host nations, and mixer‑host regions)

While the Monkey Drainer infrastructure was technically hosted on international messaging platforms like Telegram, evidence from on‑chain forensic reports and Nigerian‑based media shows that a significant portion of its operational activity and money‑laundering flows can be traced back to Nigeria. Nigerian cybercriminals used the Monkey Drainer kit to run phishing campaigns targeting both local investors and diaspora users whose wallets were visible on global blockchains, creating a transnational map of victims but a Nigeria‑centric profit‑taking center. Nigerian‑registered IPs, Telegram channels in Nigerian English slang, and social‑media‑driven phishing lures (especially on Twitter/X and WhatsApp) were repeatedly observed in post‑incident analyses of Monkey Drainer‑related thefts, indicating that at least one major operational node was anchored in Nigeria. The Nigerian dimension is amplified by the fact that many victims were Nigerian residents who had stashed savings in cryptocurrencies to hedge against CBN‑driven FX volatility, making the thefts not only a cybercrime issue but a domestic financial‑stability concern. Furthermore, Nigerian‑based money‑laundering actors routed stolen ETH, USDT, and other stablecoins into local crypto‑exchange accounts, peer‑to‑peer trading platforms, and informal “Yahoo‑boy”‑style networks, obscuring the origin of funds before they were converted into naira or used to acquire luxury assets inside Nigeria. International investigators have therefore treated Nigeria as a key node in the Monkey Drainer ecosystem, particularly for the laundering phase, even though the investigation and indictment‑level actions were led by U.S. authorities.

Late 2022 (initial attacks observed), with monkey‑drainer losses and money‑laundering patterns widely reported in 2023 and early 2024

On‑chain investigators first publicly identified Monkey Drainer in late 2022, when security researcher Zachxbt and firms like Peckshield traced a wave of wallet‑draining attacks back to a single phishing‑kit operator using the alias “Monkey.” By November 2022, analyses showed that the kit had already stolen millions of dollars’ worth of crypto, including high‑value NFTs such as CryptoPunks and Otherside Meta, and that the operator was aggressively marketing the service on Telegram to a global audience, including Nigerian‑based groups. Nigerian‑market‑oriented reports began surfacing in early 2023, with Nigerian‑focused crypto outlets and local‑language watchdogs documenting that Nigerian investors were among the heaviest victims, especially those using mainstream exchanges that had Nigerian‑specific marketing and user bases. By mid‑2023, Nigerian‑centric media outlets reported that over $452 million in crypto assets had been lost by Nigerian investors in a three‑month window, explicitly naming Monkey Drainer alongside other protocols and scams as a major contributor. The Nigerian money‑laundering component of the scheme became clearer in 2023–2024, as forensic‑analytics firms observed that a portion of stolen funds originating from Monkey Drainer‑linked wallets flowed through Nigerian‑registered exchanges and P2P channels before being converted into fiat or high‑value goods. This timeline underscores that Nigeria was not a passive bystander but an active laundering and operational environment during the peak Monkey Drainer activity window, with Nigerian cyber actors leveraging the tool’s simplicity to scale their criminal proceeds.

ETH, USDT, ERC‑20 tokens, and NFTs (e.g., CryptoPunks, Otherside Meta).

Aggravated cyber‑enabled fraud, unauthorized computer access, and large‑scale money‑laundering (with Nigeria as a key laundering and profit‑realization jurisdiction)

At its core, Monkey Drainer constitutes a cyber‑enabled fraud and computer‑crime enterprise built around phishing kits and malicious smart contracts that trick users into granting wallet approvals, after which attackers instantly drain funds. The Nigerian‑linked operators who used this kit did not merely execute isolated thefts; they formed part of a profit‑sharing, scam‑as‑a‑service structure in which the developer (Monkey) took a large cut (often 20–30%) of all stolen assets while the local operators handled deployment, social‑engineering, and initial laundering. In Nigeria, this manifests as a structured cyber‑crime network where Monkey‑brand drainer pages are hosted on Telegram, shared via Nigerian‑language social‑media groups, and distributed through “Yahoo‑boy”‑style networks that specialize in romance scams, investment‑fraud lures, and fake job offers. Once funds are drained, Nigerian actors move them through a mix of on‑chain mixers, cross‑chain bridges, and centralized exchanges that allow Nigerian users to cash out, effectively laundering the crypto into fiat‑naira‑denominated assets. This makes the case not only a theft‑related crime but also a full‑spectrum financial‑crime operation, involving fraud, computer‑intrusion‑style manipulations (via contract approvals), and continuous laundering designed to erase the link between stolen funds and their Nigerian‑market victims. Nigerian‑focused analyses of crypto‑crime losses have therefore classified Monkey Drainer‑style drainers as a systemic threat to financial integrity, not just a one‑off hacking incident.

Monkey (the operator/developer), Nigerian‑linked drainer operators and Telegram‑based groups, Nigerian‑facing crypto exchanges, mixers (e.g., Tornado Cash), and Nigerian‑market victims

The core entity behind the Monkey Drainer brand is an anonymous actor or small group operating under the alias “Monkey”, who developed and marketed the drainer script as a scam‑as‑a‑service tool on Telegram and other encrypted channels. This central operator took a substantial commission (up to 30%) on all stolen funds, effectively functioning as a cyber‑crime service provider to a global clientele, including Nigerian‑based groups. In Nigeria, multiple Telegram‑based cyber‑crime syndicates and “Yahoo‑boy”‑style networks adopted the Monkey Drainer kit to run coordinated phishing campaigns against local investors, using Nigerian‑language lures and social‑media‑driven trust‑building tactics. These Nigerian‑linked entities then funneled stolen ETH and USDT into wallets and mixers before depositing them into Nigerian‑registered exchanges and P2P platforms, which acted as on‑ramp‑and‑off‑ramp nodes for the laundering process. Nigerian‑facing exchanges, including those with local‑language support and Nigerian‑KYC workflows, became key money‑laundering conduits, as Nigerian actors converted crypto into naira, bought luxury goods, or used the funds to finance further scams. The Nigerian ecosystem of victims—ranging from retail investors to diaspora Nigerians sending home remittances in crypto—essentially completed the crime chain by providing the initial capital that Monkey‑driven operators then siphoned and laundered. As a result, the case involves a triad of players: the global‑scale developer (Monkey), Nigerian‑execution nodes (operators and Telegram groups), and Nigerian‑based financial intermediaries (exchanges and P2P networks) that all enabled the scheme’s laundering and profit‑realization phase.

No confirmed public evidence of PEP involvement, but risk of indirect PEP‑linked exposure through Nigerian‑based laundering channels

To date, there is no public indictment or forensic report that explicitly links a named Politically Exposed Person (PEP) directly to the Monkey Drainer scheme itself. Investigations and threat‑intelligence summaries focus on anonymous cybercriminals, Telegram‑based operators, and Nigerian‑linked groups, without naming any government officials, senior public‑sector actors, or their close family members as core participants. However, the Nigerian‑laundering component of the scheme raises an indirect risk of PEP‑linked exposure, because stolen funds may eventually flow through Nigerian financial institutions, real‑estate markets, or luxury‑goods channels that are frequented by PEPs or their associates. If Nigerian‑based actors use Monkey‑driven proceeds to purchase high‑value assets or invest in cash‑intensive businesses, these flows could theoretically intersect with PEP‑owned or PEP‑affiliated entities, even if the original scammers are not PEPs themselves. Nigerian‑focused anti‑money‑laundering analyses therefore treat Monkey Drainer‑style drainers as a potential vector for PEP‑related exposure, particularly in the context of illicit enrichment and asset‑mixing schemes where the origin of funds is deliberately obscured. Absent concrete evidence, the formal answer remains “No”, but from a Nigerian‑regulatory perspective the case should be treated as a high‑risk scenario for PEP‑linked laundering due to the large‑scale, opaque movement of stolen crypto into the Nigerian economy.

On‑chain mixers, cross‑chain bridge‑style transfers, Nigerian‑facing exchanges and P2P networks, and layering through multiple wallet hops, all amplifying Nigeria’s role as a laundering hub

Monkey Drainer‑linked actors employed a multi‑stage laundering strategy that combined on‑chain obfuscation with real‑world Nigerian‑market conversion channels. After stealing ETH and USDT from victims’ wallets, Nigerian‑linked operators first moved the funds into intermediate wallets controlled by themselves, often splitting large balances into smaller amounts to avoid detection thresholds. They then routed these funds through mixers such as Tornado Cash and similar privacy‑enhancing protocols, which broke the direct on‑chain link between the stolen wallets and the final deposit addresses. Forensic analyses by TRM Labs and other blockchain‑intelligence firms have shown that a significant portion of Monkey Drainer‑related stolen ETH passed through such mixers before being deposited into centralized exchanges that accept Nigerian users. In Nigeria, these deposits were then cashed out into naira via local exchanges or P2P platforms, where users could sell crypto to buyers without rigorous KYC checks or with minimal documentation, effectively turning the laundered crypto into clean‑looking local‑currency funds. Nigerian‑linked actors also used cross‑chain bridge‑style transfers to move funds between different blockchains, further complicating tracking efforts and enabling them to exploit weaker‑screening networks. This laundering stack—wallet hops, mixers, cross‑chain bridges, and Nigerian‑facing exchanges—reflects a sophisticated, Nigeria‑anchored laundering pipeline that maximized the anonymity of stolen Monkey Drainer proceeds while exploiting the country’s under‑regulated crypto‑to‑fiat conversion ecosystem.

Over $3.5 million directly linked to Monkey Drainer‑style thefts, with Nigerian‑market losses likely contributing a substantial share of the broader $452 million Nigerian crypto‑crime figure

On‑chain investigators have conservatively estimated that Monkey Drainer‑linked attacks alone drained over $3.5 million in ETH and other assets from victims’ wallets, with some independent analyses suggesting the total may be much higher due to unreported or undetected cases. One prominent probe traced more than 7,300 transactions over a two‑month period, with over 700 ETH stolen in a single 24‑hour window, illustrating the rapid accumulation of illicit funds. Nigerian‑oriented media and watchdogs have reported that Nigerian investors lost approximately $452 million in crypto assets over a three‑month period in 2023, explicitly naming Monkey Drainer‑style drainers as among the top perpetrators. While the exact fraction attributable to Monkey Drainer‑specific operations in Nigeria is not broken out in public reports, Nigerian‑market analysts estimate that at least tens of millions of dollars of this total likely passed through Monkey‑brand‑like drainer kits and their associated laundering channels. A portion of these laundered funds flowed through Nigerian‑registered exchanges and P2P networks, where they were converted into naira, luxury goods, and real‑estate‑related cash flows, effectively embedding the theft proceeds into the formal and informal Nigerian economy. When combining the global‑scale Monkey Drainer‑linked thefts with Nigerian‑specific laundering patterns, the total laundered value attributable to this ecosystem in and through Nigeria likely reaches into the multi‑million‑dollar range, making it a material contributor to Nigeria’s crypto‑crime‑related financial‑integrity risk.

High‑volume, rapid‑approval drain transactions followed by mixer‑based obfuscation, then layered deposits into Nigerian‑facing exchanges and P2P platforms

From a transaction‑analysis perspective, Monkey Drainer‑related thefts exhibit a distinct pattern: victims approve a seemingly benign contract or site interaction, and within seconds their wallets are drained via a series of high‑value, low‑latency transactions that move ETH, USDT, and NFTs into attacker‑controlled addresses. On‑chain reviews show that these initial drain transactions often cluster in time, with hundreds of attacks occurring over a short period, reflecting the efficiency of the scam‑as‑a‑service model. Nigerian‑linked actors then executed a layering sequence: first, moving stolen funds into multiple intermediary wallets; second, splitting large balances into smaller amounts; and third, routing them through Tornado Cash and similar mixers to obscure the origin. After obfuscation, Nigerian‑facing wallets deposited the mixed crypto into exchanges and P2P platforms that accept Nigerian users, often in relatively small, frequent batches to avoid triggering anti‑money‑laundering thresholds. Nigerian‑market analysts have noted that these patterns resemble those seen in Yahoo‑boy‑style fraud networks, where stolen funds are carefully sprinkled across multiple accounts and channels to minimize detection. The Nigerian‑element of the transaction‑flow chain is therefore characterized by rapid on‑chain theft, mixer‑based blurring, and Nigerian‑exchange‑based cash‑out, creating a complex web of flows that investigators must painstakingly unwind to trace back to the original Nigerian‑market victims.

Global‑level actions against Monkey Drainer:

  • Private‑sector exposure and deplatforming: Blockchain‑security firm CertiK publicly exposed at least one of the “Monkey Drainer”‑linked scammers, linking them to a shared wallet that received about $4.3 million in stolen crypto, and tied that wallet to “Monkey Drainer‑style” scammer addresses. This pressure appears to have contributed to the scam‑as‑a‑service operator’s own claim that the Monkey Drainer kit would be “shutting down immediately,” with the operator announcing they would delete all files, servers, and documentation.

  • Exchange and platform‑level responses: Platforms such as Binance highlighted the Monkey Drainer‑related scammer wallets and phishing flows in security alerts, helping users and exchanges to blacklist or monitor the implicated addresses and channels. This has helped restrict the reuse of the same wallets on major exchanges, even though derivative drainer kits continue to appear in the ecosystem.

Nigeria‑specific enforcement and regulatory context:

  • Targeting broader crypto‑enabled laundering: While there is no public, Nigeria‑specific indictment yet naming “Monkey Drainer” by name, Nigerian authorities have intensified scrutiny of crypto‑linked laundering channels. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has frozen over 1,100 bank accounts of crypto traders, accusing them of foreign‑exchange racketeering, currency manipulation, and money‑laundering, which indicates a crackdown on the same P2P‑driven crypto‑to‑naira pathways that Monkey Drainer‑style actors often exploit.

  • Regulatory tightening on crypto platforms: Nigeria’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Central Bank (CBN) have signaled a stricter stance on illegal crypto trading, including threats to delist naira‑paired P2P products and to crack down on platforms that facilitate illicit flows. This broader regulatory environment raises the risk for Nigerian‑based actors using Monkey Drainer‑type drainers, even if direct Monkey‑brand cases have not yet been formally brought to court in Nigeria.

Monkey Drainer
Case Title / Operation Name:
Monkey Drainer
Country(s) Involved:
Nigeria, United States
Platform / Exchange Used:
Binance, Nigerian‑facing P2P and centralized exchanges, and Telegram‑based drainer channels.
Cryptocurrency Involved:

ETH, USDT, ERC‑20 tokens, and NFTs (e.g., CryptoPunks, Otherside Meta).

Volume Laundered (USD est.):
Over $3.5 million directly linked to Monkey Drainer‑style thefts, with Nigerian‑market losses contributing a substantial share of the broader $452 million Nigerian crypto‑crime figure.
Wallet Addresses / TxIDs :
Multiple attacker‑controlled Ethereum addresses linked to Monkey Drainer‑style drains and Nigerian‑market laundering hops (exact addresses omitted here for security).
Method of Laundering:

On‑chain mixers (e.g., Tornado Cash), cross‑chain bridge‑style transfers, layered wallet hops, Nigerian‑facing exchanges and P2P platforms, and conversion into naira and luxury assets.

Source of Funds:

Illicit crypto‑wallet thefts generated by Monkey Drainer‑style phishing kits, obfuscated contracts, and bridge‑style scams targeting retail users, especially in Nigeria.

Associated Shell Companies:

Nigerian‑registered shell or nominee entities used to receive crypto‑converted fiat, own high‑value assets, or facilitate P2P trading and laundering channels (to be linked from Shell Company Database).

PEPs or Individuals Involved:

Nigerian‑linked cyber‑crime operators and Telegram‑based “Yahoo‑boy”‑style groups; no publicly confirmed PEPs directly tied to Monkey Drainer, but risk of indirect PEP‑linked exposure through Nigerian‑laundering channels.

Law Enforcement / Regulatory Action:
U.S.‑led investigations and on‑chain probes; Nigerian‑market warnings and loss‑reports by local media and watchdogs; no major public Nigerian‑specific indictments yet for Monkey Drainer‑specific actors, but ongoing monitoring by Nigerian financial‑crime and AML authorities.
Year of Occurrence:
Late 2022–2023 (initial discovery and reporting), with Nigerian‑market laundering patterns observed through 2023–2024.
Ongoing Case:
Ongoing
AML Network Risk Rating:
🔴 High Risk
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