Greatex Limited

🔴 High Risk

The UK’s real estate sector remains a prime vehicle for money laundering, with over £11 billion in suspicious wealth linked to UK properties since 2016, much of it concealed through opaque offshore shell companies and complex corporate structures. Despite legislative efforts like the Register of Overseas Entities, enforcement remains weak, allowing politically exposed persons and corrupt elites to exploit the UK’s high-value property market for asset concealment. The Greatex Limited case exemplifies these systemic vulnerabilities, exposing the UK’s ongoing struggle with financial opacity, lax anti-money laundering enforcement, and political complicity in facilitating illicit wealth flows through luxury real estate.

Greatex Limited exemplifies the UK’s real estate market vulnerabilities as a haven for money laundering through highly opaque ownership structures involving offshore shell companies. Despite legislative efforts to increase transparency, significant gaps in enforcement and compliance persist. The involvement of politically exposed persons from Kazakhstan and complex layering of ownership through British Virgin Islands companies underscore the political complicity and systemic weaknesses in the UK’s financial oversight and anti-money laundering regime. This case highlights how luxury London properties, especially in prestigious areas like Baker Street and Hyde Park, are exploited to conceal and launder illicit wealth, exacerbating the broader issues of financial opacity and asset concealment in the UK property market.

Location

London, United Kingdom (Fitzrovia area, W1W 8AF postcode)

Primarily Commercial real estate holdings (including notable leasehold and freehold properties on Baker Street, Hyde Park area, and Highgate)

Initially owned by UK private limited companies controlled through British Virgin Islands (BVI) offshore companies with complex layered ownership. Later sold to a Nigerian oil and gas magnate registered as the Person with Significant Control (PSC). Company status dissolved as of August 2021.

Initially linked to individuals close to the Kazakh first family, including Rakhat Aliyev (former Kazakh secret police chief accused of money laundering and murder). Ownership later transferred to a Nigerian oil magnate with opaque connections. The true ultimate beneficial owners remain unclear due to weak enforcement on PSC reporting.

Yes. Connections to Kazakh political elite (Rakhat Aliyev and his network).

Acquisition through offshore financing and layered ownership involving multiple UK companies and offshore BVI entities. Properties were purchased with little public transparency in ownership origins.

  • Use of layered corporate structures and shell companies registered in the British Virgin Islands to obscure true ownership.

  • Holding properties via UK companies with no public PSC disclosure despite red flags.

  • Overvaluation and rapid sales in prime London real estate to launder proceeds.

  • Concealment via nominee directors and absence of PSC filings.

  • Offshore registrations and trusts to obscure asset origins.
    Transaction History:

  • Acquisitions spanning from 2008 to 2010 covering high-profile London properties, including Baker Street and Hyde Park estates worth over £147 million.

  • Ownership transferred in 2016 to entities registered in the UAE and Nigeria; company dissolved in 2021.

  • Acquisitions spanning from 2008 to 2010 covering high-profile London properties, including Baker Street and Hyde Park estates worth over £147 million.

  • Ownership transferred in 2016 to entities registered in the UAE and Nigeria; company dissolved in 2021.

Suspected upwards of £147 million in real estate holdings tied to laundering.

  • Global Witness investigations (2015) revealing ownership links to Kazakh elite.

  • Related findings from Panama Papers and official UK investigations into money laundering via UK property.

  • Reports highlighting weak PSC compliance and offshore opacity from Transparency International UK.

  • Calls for investigations following Global Witness reports; no comprehensive enforcement actions publicly recorded.

  • Companies House acceptance of false or missing PSC information.

  • Government plans for Register of Overseas Entities enacted (post-2019) but significant gaps remain.

High

  • Related UK companies: Farmont Baker Street Limited, Dynamic Estates Limited, Parkview Estates Management Limited (all in complex ownership chains with Greatex Limited).

  • Offshore entities based in British Virgin Islands and UAE companies.

  • Nigerian oil and gas magnate as later PSC.

Commercial, Luxury Real Estate

Layering, Use of Shell Companies, Concealment of Beneficial Ownership

Europe (UK)

High

Greatex Limited

Greatex Limited
Country:
United Kingdom
City / Location:
London (Fitzrovia area, W1W 8AF postcode)
Developer / Owner Entity:
Initially owned by UK private limited companies linked to British Virgin Islands offshore companies; Later owned by a Nigerian oil and gas magnate
Linked Individuals :

Rakhat Aliyev (former Kazakh secret police chief, PEP), Nigerian oil magnate (later registered PSC)

Source of Funds Suspected:

Suspected proceeds of corruption, embezzlement, money laundering linked to Kazakh elite and opaque offshore structures

Investment Type:
Purchase (via layered offshore financing and corporate structures)
Method of Laundering:
Use of shell companies, layering, overvaluation, nominee directors, concealment via trusts and offshore entities
Value of Property:
Approximately £147 million
Offshore Entity Involved?
1
Shell Company Used?
1
Project Status:
Complete
Associated Legal / Leak Files:

Global Witness reports (2015), UK Judiciary NCA v Baker case, Panama Papers, PSC register compliance reports

Year of Acquisition / Construction:
🔴 High Risk